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This thesis provides a cost benefit analysis of
installing a Recovery Exercise Module (REM) in a Cruise
Missile for an Operational Test Launch.
Topics considered include: Should the Cruise Missile
Project Office (CMPO) continue development of a new
redesigned REM; should all test missiles be intentionally
destroyed or should the REM be utilized; can the Non-
Tactical Instrumentation Kit (NTIK), being developed for the
Air Force be a cost effective test procedure for the Sea
Launched Cruise Missile?
The conclusion that was reached is that the CMPO should
maintain use of the current REM model and cancel plans to
redesign the REM. Additionally, REM production and test
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. AREA OF RESEARCH
The research presented is a "Cost Benefit Analysis of
Installing a Recovery Exercise Module (REM) in a Cruise
Missile For Operational Test Launches (OTL)."
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The questions to be answered, in this research study,
center on one main question. Is it cost beneficial for the
Cruise Missile Project Office (CMPO) to have a REM installed
in the Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) for its OTL in
order to recover the missile and refurbish it for future
use, or is it cost beneficial to destroy the missile and
build a replacement?
Subsidiary questions include:
- Is it beneficial to destroy only certain types of
missiles, such as the SLCM nuclear land attack missile
(TLAM-A) ?
- Can the Range Safety System (RSS), required on all test
launches, be installed using the Non-Tactical
Instrumentation Kit (NTIK) being developed by General
Dynamics for use on the Air Force Ground Launched Cruise
Missile (GLCM)?
- Is it cost beneficial to build a new redesigned REM to
replace the current REM model?
C. DISCUSSION
In response to the growing threat of the Soviet surface
fleet and cruise missiles in the early 1970' s, the Navy
conducted studies to analyze the feasibility of developing a
submarine launched cruise missile (Conrow, Smith, and
Barbour, p.^, 1982). During this same time period the Air
Force was engaged in the development of an Air-Launched
Cruise Missile (ALCM). Due to system similarities, cost
effectiveness was sought for the project to "maximize
subsystem/component commonality and quantity buy, to utilize
fully joint test and evaluation, to encourage subsystem/
second-source competitive procurement and to otherwise
derive maximum benefit from the joint service management of
several separable cruise missile programs" (Conrow, Smith,
and Barbour, p. 12, 1982). Subsequently, reduced costs of
missile testing also became a major objective.
"The modular design of the cruise missile permitted the
use of a REM which allowed a parachute section to be
substituted for the warhead portion of the missile when not
needed for that particular test" (Conrow, Smith and Barbour,
p. 33, 1983). The REM "provides for range safety, override
command control, tracking and telemetry." It is also
equipped with a receiver decoder, pulse code modulated
encoder, S-Band transmitter and C-Band transponder. When
the REM is not utilized, a Range Safety System (RSS) must be
utilized for safety precautions. The RSS provides for
identical functions that exist in the REM, with the
exception that it does not provide for missile recovery.
(Joint Cruise Missile Project, p. 61, 1986)
The original projections concluded that the use of a REM
and subsequent refurbishment costs would result in the cost
of a recovered missile being 10% of the cost of building a
new missile. Both the REM and the missile could be
refurbished and reused. Additionally, it was projected that
the REM could be utilized for four separate flight tests
during its life cycle. However, to date only one of the
current REM models has been utilized four times and several
have been destroyed in unsuccessful test flights. Moreover,
cost of the REMs, as well as REM and missile refurbishment,
have dramatically escalated. Hidden costs of the REM system
have also been materializing. These include Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) used in missile and REM
refurbishment, salvage and recovery costs to return a
reusable test missile to the refurbishment facility,
additional logistics costs, costs for additional Government
personnel to monitor the REM project and new REM development
costs. Unfortunately all costs of the system have not yet
been identified, and costs of the system are not centrally
managed
.
This study is intended to identify the costs of this




D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
There are several va^riants of the Cruise Missile that
have been developed since the inception of the project. The
ALCM, the GLCM, and the SLCM serve many different functions
within the defense organization of the United States.
Due to the cost and numbers of missiles involved in the
production process, testing of the missile has been
extensive. In order to cut back on costs of testing the
missile the REM is utilized when conducting many of the
OTL's.
This research study will evaluate the cost of utilizing
the REM within the Navy's test program. These include the
following versions of the SLCM:
1
)
TLAM-A which is a nuclear armed land attack missile.
2) TASM (Tactical Anti-Ship Missile) which is a version
of the ship to ship missile.
3) TLAM-C (Tactical Land Attack Missile - Conventional)
which is a conventionally armed land attack missile.
Certain missile configurations, such as the TLAM-D
(Tactical Land Attack Missile - Multiple Payload), will not
be evaluated. Use of the REM on these versions of the SLCM
are not practical due to the size of the payload.
Additionally, all test missiles that have been scheduled for
total destruction will also be eliminated from this study.
E. METHODOLOGY
The data for this study were collected using a variety
of methods. The use of interviews provided personal
experience and background for the study. Personal observa-
tion at the CMPO and General Dynamics Convair Division
(GD/C) helped relate the theory basis of the study to the
actual methods used in cost collection. Historical data were
collected from a variety of publications on the cruise
missile, including the Rand Corporation notes on the JCMP's
acquisition history. Current projects :n the future use of
the REM were collected from documents and reports prepared
by GD/C and the CMPO. Finally, collection of actual cost
data from Navy contracts covering the previous four years
provided the relevant information to complete the analysis.
F. DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS
Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) ; Strategic missile
used by the Air Force as a standoff weapons system to
penetrate Soviet air defenses. It is built exclusively by
Boeing Aircraft Company (BAC). Its major launch platform is
the B-52 bomber, which can carry 20 missiles in its rotary
racks. The ALCM can carry a nuclear warhead 1500 nautical
miles (NM) (Betts, p.46-A7, 1981). With fewer variants then
the SLCM and greater production schedules than the SLCM and
GLCM, the ALCM has the least cost per missile.
1
All-Up Round (AUR): Missile airframe, sustainer engine,
booster, and guidance system that are contained in a
canister used to protect the missile during handling,
transporting, and periods of storage.
Ground- Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM): Tactical missile
used by the Air Force and NATO forces in Western Europe. It
has a 1500 NM range and carries a nuclear warhead. It is
launched from truck launching platforms called Transporter
Erector Launchers (TELs) (Betts, p. 579-580, 1981). The
missile is similar in size to the TEAM missiles and uses
both an inertial and Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) form
of guidance system (Hobbs, p. 15, 1982).
Non- Tactical Instrumentation Kit (NTIK);
The GLCM NTIK is a payload instrumentation package
compatible with the war reserve W84 payload canister and
cabling. It emulates the W84 electronic outputs to the
Weapon Control System and provides necessary ballast to
maintain missile center of gravity and moment arm
characteristics throughout the flight profile.
Instrumentation in the NTIK provides for range safety
control (including emergency flight termination), radar
signature enhancement, and prelaunch/ inf
1
ight telemetry
of real time missile performance data. The NTIK does
not provide for recovery of the test missile. To
provide NTIK interface with the operational missile,
wiring harness modifications and the addition of cable
connectors are required. These changes must be
incorporated during missile production or
recertif ication . The NTIK consists of W2 wiring
harness; special nose cone with S-band, C-band, IFF, and
Range Safety System antennas; and the instrumented
warhead casing. (Hill and Myers, p.1, 1986)
This is a new system being developed for the Air Force which
takes the place of the RSS. Its advantage over the RSS is
that the NTIK can be replaced at the field level versus
1 1
having to send the missile back to GD/C for the RSS
installation. (Joint Cruise Missile Project, p. 10, 1986)
Recovery Exercise Module (REM) ; Replaces the missile
payload section during OTLs when recovery and refurbishment
of the missile is intended. The REM uses a system of three
parachutes so that the missile landing will minimize
structural damage. The REM also provides for range safety,
override command control, tracking and telemetry. Equipment
installed in the REM include a pulse code modulated (PCM)
encoder, S-band transmitter, C-band transmitter and a
receiver decoder. (Joint Cruise Missile Project, p. 61, 1986)
Range Safety System (RSS) ; Similar to the REM in all
respects, except that it lacks the parachute recovery
mechanisms. Therefore, the RSS is used only on an OTL
determined to be a target hit. (Joint Cruise Missile
Project, p. 61 , 1 986
)
Recertification : Maintenance procedure performed on
Cruise Missiles at predetermined intervals. For the TASM it
is 30 months and for the TLAM missiles it is 36 months.
Recertification includes
removing payload, maintenance and test of guidance set
components, engine removal and replacement, air vehicle
test and inspection and rocket motor removal and
replacement. In addition specialized processing such as
environmental stress screening, inspections, surveys,
and engineering order incorporation may be performed as
part of the AUR reliability improvement program. (Joint
Cruise Missile Project, p. 72, 1986)
1 2
Refurbishment: Returning a missile and/or a REM to a
useable condition after an OTL. It includes replacing
expendable parts, calibrating various reuseable parts and
repairing the missile airframe. A refurbishment procedure
completes all the tests required during missile
recer tif ication . Therefore a missile that has been
refurbished does not require recer tif ication until the full
length of its predetermined maintenance interval expires.
(JCM-1963, p.AA, 1985)
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) ; The most diverse of
all versions of the Cruise Missile. Nicknamed the
"TOMAHAWK" it has been responsible for vast improvements in
the Navy's anti-surface, as well as overall, military
capabilities in an era that has seen an unprecedented build-
up in Soviet Naval forces. There are four different
variants of the SLCM all of which can be launched from
submarines or surface ships.
The TLAM-A nuclear-armed land attack missile is a
tactical missile capable of carrying a 200 kiloton warhead
1500 NM. It is identical in size to the GLCM.
The TLAM-C is a tactical missile that is similar in size
to the TLAM-A. However, due to its conventional payload it
carries a much larger sized warhead. Therefore, its range
is diminished to 700 NM. (Betts, p. 46 - 48, 1981)
The TLAM-D is a tactical multi-warhead missile that is
similar in size to the other TLAM missiles. The missile is
1 3
capable of dropping multiple warheads onto various areas of
a given target, usually an enemy airfield.
TASM is a more advanced version of the Harpoon missile
(anti-ship missile now used in the fleet), with twice the
payload and four to five times the range (300 NM). Due to
its missile search capabilities it carries a more
sophisticated guidance system than the other SLCM variants.
( Betts, p. 46 - 50, 1 981 )
The Navy is retrofitting the Spruance class (DD963)
destroyers, nuclear powered cruisers, battleships, and most
submarines to carry the Tomahawk. The Aegis equipped
Ticonderoga class (CGA7) cruisers and the Arliegh Burke




The cruise missile is not an innovation of the last
several decades. In fact, its roots go almost as far back
as the advent of the flying machine. The earliest version
dates back to 1915 and efforts made by Peter C. Hewett and
Elmer A. Sperry, to build a "flying bomb." Military
interest in this new weapon was not significant until the
United States entered World War I. At that time, the Navy
awarded the Sperry Gyroscope company a research and
development contract for the "flying bomb." However, early
technology proved inadequate to support the weapon and the
program was canceled in 1922. (Werrell, p. 7, 1985)
The first successful use of an air breathing missile
did not come until World War II. The Germans developed the
V-1 buzz bomb and the V-2 (a ballistic missile version of
the V-1). Both missiles were similar in range (150 miles),
payload (2000 pound warhead) and accuracy (within 8 miles of
their target, 80 percent of the time), however, the V-2 was
much faster and far less vulnerable to interception by enemy
air defenses.
The success of the German V-1 and V-2, along with the
advent of nuclear weapons, enhanced U.S. interest in a
cruise missile. After World War II the Navy and Air Force
1 5
made several attempts at building a cruise missile. The
Navy undertook the development of a cruise missile that
could be launched from the decks of surface ships and
submarines. In 1951 the Navy introduced the Regulus
missile. It had a range of 500 miles and a speed of 600
miles per hour (mph). In the late 1950's the Regulus II was
introduced, with a range in excess of 1000 miles.
During this same period the Air Force began introducing
its versions of the Cruise Missile, The Matador, with a 600
mile range and 650 mph speed was tested as early as 1949.
The Mace was introduced about 1956. It had a range of 1200
miles and a speed of 650 mph. However, this version used an
early form of terrain correlation and map matching guidance
system in place of the early ground control guidance system.
(De Paz, p. 79-80, 1983)
Unfortunately, the early missile systems carried over-
sized warheads and had inefficient turbojet engines with
heavy power requirements and highly inaccurate guidance
systems. The high trajectory flight paths also made these
missiles highly vulnerable to enemy air defense systems.
Therefore, research and development funds were shifted to
the development of the ballistic missile system.
(Pfatzgraff, p. 6, 1977)
During the 1960's the Air Force still worked on the
development of an air breathing missile, but these were to
be used as an added dimension to the B-52 bombers. The
1 6
Hound Dog missile, with a range of 700 miles and speed of
Mach 2, was to be used as a standoff weapon system and the
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) Quail was to
be used as a decoy missile to simulate the B-52 on enemy
radar. (De Paz, p.8l , 1 983
)
B. MODERN CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
During the 1960's vast improvements were made in the jet
engine, guidance system reliability, computer size and
capability, as well as terrain contour matching systems
(TERCOM). These advances made the development of a cost
effective cruise missile a reality. In 1968 the Air Force
began development of the Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAD).
It was to be used with the B-52 bomber to weaken enemy air
defense capabilities during a nuclear strike. The Strategic
Air Command (SAC) war scenario was to use this new weapon to
assist the B-52 in penetrating the enemy defensive zone.
However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense ( OSD ) wanted
to utilize the SCAD capabilities as a standoff weapon and a
substitute for the B-1 bomber. With the prospect of the
loss of the B-1, the Air Force became less than enthusiastic
in promoting the new weapon system.
During the early 1960'3 the Navy saw little need for
cruise missiles. Its strategy consisted of using aircraft
carriers to make deep strikes into enemy positions and the
use of ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union's strategy
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during this period did include the development of cruise
missile systems. In 1967, the launching of a Soviet Styx
missile would quickly alter the Navy's policy when the
Egyptian Navy, using a Soviet missile system, sank the
Israeli destroyer EILAT.
By 1969 the Navy established the Harpoon anti-ship
missile program. The airframe would be built by MDAC, and
it would carry a 500 pound warhead 60 NM. In 1975 the
Harpoon received production go-ahead and by 1979 the Navy
had over 1000 missiles in its inventory.
In the early 1970's the Navy conducted studies to
determine the feasibility of a submarine launched cruise
missile. This effort was carried out under a separate
program within the Harpoon project office called Cruise
Missile (Advanced).
In 1972 the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT)
agreement gave the cruise missile an unexpected boost. The
treaty limited Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), but
placed no limitations on any cruise missiles. The Navy was,
therefore, able to convince Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
Melvin Laird that the cruise missile would give the U.S.
strategic and tactical weapon systems at relatively low
costs. By April 1973 the SLCM established its own project
office. (Werrell, p. 1A6-153, 1985)
In June 1973 the SCAD program had been officially-
canceled. This, however, was short lived as the program was
revived in December, under the name ALCM.
Although the Navy and Air Force were running two
separate cruise missile programs there was a great deal of
cooperation in the development of key missile components, as
OSD stressed system commonality. This process would
increase cost effectiveness of the Cruise Missile as DOD
could fully utilize quantity buys, test and evaluation
requirements, joint planning requirements for future test
projects, and subsystem/second-source competitive contract
agreements. (Conrow, Smith and Barbour, p. 12, 1982) In
October 1975 MDAC was selected as the contractor of the
guidance system for both the SLCM and the ALCM. In March
1976 GD/C was selected as the SLCM airframe contractor and
in May 1976 Williams International Corporation (WIC) was
selected as the SLCM engine developer for the ALCM.
Although BAC had been working on the development of the
ALCM (BAC was also the airframe contractor for the SCAD)
GD/C was pursuing an air-launched version of the SLCM.
Since it was not cost effective to use two separate versions
of the ALCM, BAC and GD/C were locked into a competitive
flyoff in September 1977. BAC's close association with SAC
and its projected two year development lead of the ALCM put
GD/C at a decided disadvantage. However, GD/C was able to
bridge the developmental gap with a more aggressive and cost
effective testing program. The missile modular design
permitted GD/C to use a parachute REM. The REM was
substituted for the warhead portion of the missile when it
was not required for a particular test. This allowed GD/C
to recover the missile, with minimal damage, and evaluate
the individual systems within the missile. The missile was
then refurbished and reused for additional tests (Conrow,
Smith and Barbour, p. 33, 1982). Despite these developments,
BAG'S overall understanding of the B-52 and SAC helped it
stave off GD/C's advances and was awarded the ALGM contract
in April 1980. The decision marked the ALCM's transition
from the JCMPO, which was established after the Defense
System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) II decision
memorandum in January 1977, to ASD at Wright Patterson Air
Force Base (WPAFB) (Conrow, Smith and Barbour, p. 61-68,
1982). Besides its establishment of the JCMPO and its
assignment to conduct the ALCM competition, the January 1977
DSARC II directed the development of a GLCM using Tomahawk
technology .
Again commonality of the Cruise Missile systems as well
as its modular design would play a major role in the GLGM's
development. Due to the common airframe, engine, and
guidance system between the TLAM-A variation of the SLCM and
the GLCM, test data obtained from one was directly
applicable to the other.
20
The SLCM has been the biggest benefactor of commonality
due to the number of missile variants. The test and
evaluation program for each missile variant has benefited
from data gathered on OTLs from other missile variants.
Even in the case of a test launch for the TASM, which uses a
different guidance system than the other SLCMs, data
gathered on airframe, engine, and warhead fuzing performance
are applicable to the TLAM missiles. Commonality and the
modular design also allows the Navy to change the mission of
a SLCM by simply changing sections forward of the wings.
Therefore, a cruise missile originally built as a TLAM-C can
be converted into a TASM. (Conrow, Smith and Barbour, p. 33,
1 982)
On 1 October 1986 the Air Force/Navy JCMP was
redesignated as the Cruise Missile Project (CMP) and
assigned as PDA14 within the Naval Air Systems Command.
C. THE RECOVERY EXERCISE MODULE BACKGROUND
The REM was developed by GD/C in 1977. The original
intent of the REM was to aid in the recovery of its own test
missile and to make it practical to evaluate the effects of
a missile launch on the various missile systems/ components.
The recovered missile could then be refurbished and equipped
for additional test flights or it could be fitted as a fully
operational missile. All this could be accomplished at a
fraction of the cost for a new missile and in less time
21
than it would take to build a new missile. Therefore, in
keeping with the cost effective nature of the cruise missile
the Navy decided to use this procedure on the production
missile they would be testing.
For OTL Reliability, the SLCM TEMP directs that the
contractor will guarantee that a specified percentage of
Tomahawk flight test missiles will successfully fly the
specified missile profile from the launch platform to
the target. Flight test missiles will be randomly
selected from fleet assets by the Navy and returned to
the contractor for the REM or RSS installation. Dual
government and contractor inspection will occur during
this evaluation to ensure that REM installation and
minimum checkout is performed to ensure similarity to
the present fleet population. The missile will then be
returned to the designated launch platform for firing.
(Conrow, Smith and Barbour: Appendixes, p. 41, 1982)
The REM would permit an estimated 75% of SLCMs to be tested
and recovered. The missile could then be refurbished,
rearmed, and returned to the fleet (Conrow, Smith and
Barbour: Appendixes, p • '^ 1 , 1982). REMs could also be
refurbished and used again if the missile is recovered.
There have been various models of the REM since the
program's inception. The earliest model was used by GD/C
and the Navy in tests conducted between 1977 and 1983.
During this period two test failures were attributed to the
REM (see Figure 1). In late 1983 the Navy began using the
REM still in current use. It provided for better telemetry
data and tracking. During 39 OTLs using the REM between
October 1983 and August 1986 seven REMs were expended as a
result of problems with the test. This provides for an 18%


















































































































GD/C is currently the only contractor capable of
building/refurbishing the REM. Current goals are to
redesign the REM for improved producibil i ty , reliability and
maintainability. If approved, the new REM could go into
production by late 1988 (Joint Cruise Missile Project, p.
61-6A, 1986). The major features, as demonstrated in
Figures 2 through 5, also include the ability to refurbish
the REM for reuse in less time than the current REM, thus
decreasing the need for additional REMs. The new Pulse Code
Modulation (PCM) encoder will enhance telemetry data from
the missile. The old PCM encoder, used on most current REM
models, had experienced a 50% failure rate.
The FY87 acquisition approach is currently planned
as a sole source contract award to GD/C for REM/RSS
hardware requirements. The sole source justification is
based on the unique development experience of GD/C, the
original designer and developer of REMs/RSSs, and the
limited number of units procured each year. GD/C and
MDAC have been transferring and exchanging technical
data as part of a competitive dual source program for
the AUR. The REM and RSS kit data package, however, has
not been a part of this exchange program. The current
data package that has been generated is not adequate for
competitive reprocurement data package. Therefore, the
government did not buy engineering drawings adequate for
competitive reprocurement of REM and RSS kits. Along
with the fact that GD/C is the only company having the
expertise to manufacture REM and RSS kits, GD/C is also
the only company capable of producing them in a timely
fashion. (Joint Cruise Missile Project, p. 10, 1986)
Drawings and a data package are being procured from GD/C and
component subcontractors in order to compete production for
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It should be noted that an RSS is required for OTL flights
when the missile is not equipped with a REM. This is to
enable the flight to be terminated in the case of
uncorrectable problems while the missile is in flight.
E. MISSILE TEST PROCEDURES
The DOD is highly interested in ensuring that the
missiles they procure will be operational, if needed. Two
factors contribute to operational readiness:
1) Missile system readiness: This includes storage and
free flight reliability as well as launch and hit
probabil i ties
.
2) Platform readiness: This relates to the ship or
submarine and is a function of launch control system
availabili ty
.
The SLCM TEMP states that:
anti-ship and land-attack Tomahawk Cruise Missiles are
being procured under an AUR warranty concept which
includes contractor maintenance for the life cycle of
the weapon system. Successful accomplishment of the
warranty will be determined in terms of three
guarantees: Missile OTL Reliability; Missile
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Recertif ication/Readiness Reliability; and Missile
Turnaround Guarantee. (Conrow, Smith and Barbour:
Appendixes, p. 41, 1982)
For recertif ication
,
missiles are shipped back to the
weapons depot for further shipment to GD/C, in San Diego,
California or MDAC, in Titusville, Florida. Nuclear warhead
missiles are shipped to a depot for warhead removal, prior
to shipment to GD/C or MDAC. Recertif ication cycles are 30
months for TASM missiles and 36 months for TLAM missiles.
(Joint Cruise Missile Project, P-72, 1986) In the case of
missile recertif ication the contractor:
will guarantee that a specified percentage of Tomahawk
recertif ication tests and sample readiness tests on
missiles will successfully meet test requirements. The
warranty recertif ication provides planned test
maintenance actions which are specifically designed to
renew the contractor's confidence in the warran tab il i ty
of the missile. The readiness test will be performed on
a sample basis as selected by the government and
extensively exercise the missile in a simulated mission
environment test. (Conrow, Smith and Barbour:
Appendixes, p. 42, 1982)
For the missile turnaround guarantee, the contractor
will guarantee that all recertified missiles will be
returned to the fleet in a specified time period. (Conrow,
Smith and Barbour: Appendixes, p. 42, 1982)
The operational test launch procedures are much more
complex than that of missile recertif ication . Just as in
the recertification procedures the missiles are sent back to
GD/C. After the missile is defueled a REM or an RSS is
placed into the missile in the same section previously
reserved by the payload. If the missile is meant for a
30
destruction test the RSS will be installed. If the missile
is meant to be recovered a REM and REM peculiar kit will be
installed. The missile is then refueled and transferred to
a weapons station for further transfer to a fleet unit. The
missile test which occurs from an at sea unit is usually
scheduled to destruct or set down on a land target.
Flotation gear is installed in the REM if the missile should
land in the water. Figure 6 is an illustration of a land/
sea touchdown.
After an RSS missile test, salvage crews will pick-up any
remaining pieces and box them. After a REM missile test,
salvage crews decontaminate and crate the missile for
shipment back to GD/C. The shipment can be by land or air
carrier, however, special precautions must be taken
regarding the classified nature of the missiles. Upon
return to GD/C the used REM is removed and refurbished for
future use on another test missile. The missile is also
refurbished and either a new/ ref urb ished REM is installed
for additional testing or the missile is returned to a
condition for operational use. If the missile is a TLAM-A
its warhead is replaced at a designated depot. The missile,
once completed, is shipped back to the weapons station for
further transfer to a fleet unit.
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The costs involved in installing a REM for OTLs versus
modifying a missile with an RSS will be the subject of this
chapter. Costs involved in installing a REM in a missile
vary, but are not limited to costs such as purchasing the
REM, labor charges for installation, government personnel
costs for those dedicated to the project, and transportation
costs of shipping a recovered missile. There are costs that
are unavoidable, no matter what method of testing is used.
These costs include the use of a shipping container and the
use of a container used in firing the missile. These
containers are usually refurbished for future use but the
use of the container will not change with the philosophy of
how a test should be conducted. Another example of an
unavoidable cost would be the cost of facilities used in the
missile testing program. Sunk costs will also be a factor
in evaluating alternatives. Sunk costs in this study would
include items currently in inventory, such as a REM that has
been purchased by the Government.
Project costs can not always be definitive. Costs
involved in each missile can easily change with the location
of the missile test, the type of damage experienced from a
missile landing, part failures, or funding delays.
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Therefore, average costs have been used in determining some
costs while other costs have been applied by using the best
application that is possible in establishing these cost
figures. For example, the total number of personnel working
on the project may not be known, but a reasonable assumption
can be made as to the minimum number of personnel assigned.
The following costs will be evaluated:
AUR missile costs
Current and redesigned REM unit costs
REM installation and refurbishment costs
AUR refurbishment costs
GFP recertif ication costs for the AUR missile
AUR missile and REM over and above refurbishment costs
Transportation costs for missile shipments
Salvage costs during missile recovery
Recertif ication costs of an AUR missile
Personnel costs of those involved in the REM project
Nuclear warhead removal costs
RSS unit and installation costs
Costs of missile recovery equipment
Costs associated with the NTIK
B. MISSILE COSTS
The AUR missile costs vary with the different missile
variations. This is a factor of economies of scale in the
production process and various complexities involved in
producing a missile. These include the more sophisticated
guidance sets required in the TASM to the increased costs of
compensating for a larger payload section in a conventional
warhead versus using a nuclear warhead. Costs of missiles
that will not be considered are the non-recurring
procurement support costs and fleet support costs as these
costs will not change with the additional purchase of a
34
missile. Due to the relatively small number of missiles
tested in relation to any production population it is
projected that purchases of additional missiles to
compensate for destruction tests instead of recovery tests
will not change the economies of scale for procurement
purposes. The number of SLCM test flights that are funded
and approved are included in Figure 7.
The cost of the SLCM variants in 1987 dollars during
1987 from the JCMPO POM 88 report are as follows:
UNIT COST (THOUSAND $)
TLAM-A TASM TLAM-C























The fuel is required for product acceptance testing on
the TASM. The RMUC is the heart of the guidance set on land
attack missiles and is not required on the TASM. The DSMAC
is used on conventional land attack missiles, such as the
TLAM-C and the TLAM-D.
The total cost figure for a missile during FY88 through
FY93 does in fact decrease from as little as $39,000 to as
much as $124,000 depending upon the variant, using 1987
dollars. This is illustrated by the cost of a TLAM-C which
in FY87 will cost $1,806,000 per missile, but in FY93 (JCM-
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212 Budget Report, 1987) the cost is projected to decrease
to $1,682,000. Of course, economies of scale and start-up
costs play a major role in the savings.
C. REM COSTS
There are several facets to the cost of the REM. There
are the costs of buying the unit from GD/C, the production
costs of improving the REM, and the number of times the REM
can be utilized on different OTLs.
The cost of the REM in current use, as illustrated in
Figure 8, range from $71^K to $784K. There are currently 24
REMs that have not been modified with the currently funded
production upgrades (funded at $5.8M) and 5 REMs with
production modifications (including an upgraded PCM
encoder). There are 5 additional REMs scheduled for
delivery in FY88. As these items have already been
contracted for or are already in inventory the costs will be
considered sunk costs. If the decision is made to purchase
REMs of similar design an average cost of $748K will be
used. The projected cost of purchasing a redesigned REM
will be in the range of $444K to $515K depending on the
mission peculiar kit required. An average cost of $470K
will be used in this study. (General Dynamics, 1986)
The production costs used to accomplish the redesign of
the REM include development costs, transition to production







CURRENT REM REDESIGNED REM
REM UNIT 62AK
EXPENDABLE KIT 85K
MISSION PECULIAR KIT 3 TO 7^K
REM UNIT A41 K






COST SAVINGS OF $270K PER REM
(General Dynamics, 1986)
Figure 8. Current REM vs Redesigned REM cost Comparison
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9 and 10. These costs will be nonrecurring after the
initial funding for the project, which is estimated to be
$21. 4M, as of the 30 March 1987 REM program status report.
Of this amount $5.8M has been funded and is considered sunk
cost. Therefore, the viable cost to be considered is the
$15. 6M that remains unfunded. Of this amount $1.6M is for a
GLCM commitment, as illustrated in Figure 11. For this
study the $1^M cost is divided over a five year payback
period and 18 OTLs per year. This amounts to an additional
cost of $155,556 per flight. It should be noted that if a
shorter payback period is considered the cost per flight
increases .
The cost of a REM can be broken down into a cost per
OTL. From the period of October 1983 through August 1986,
seven REMs were rendered unusable during the course of
thirty-nine REM installed OTLs, for an attrition rate of
18%. This allows each REM to be used an average of 5.55
times during an average life cycle (this is determined by
dividing the attrition rate of 18% into a possible 100%
success rate). It should be noted, that in interviews with
personnel from the CMPO and GD/C, the original projection
was that the REM could be used a total of four times unless
it was disabled in an unsuccessful test flight. To date,
none of the current REMs in use have been used more than
four times. However, all personnel interviewed from the
CMPO and GD/C concluded that there is no design deficiency
39















ONE (1) FIRST ARTICLE REM
TTP COST $15. IM
TOTAL NON-RECURRING COST $20. 9M
(Cruise Missile Project Report, 1986)
Figure 9. Redesigned REM TTP and Development costs





TOTAL NON-RECURRING COST $ 0.5M
TOTAL PROGRAH NON-RECURRING COST $20^
- 5,m
(Cruise Missile Project Report, 1986)
Figure 10. Redesigned REM Non-Recurring Costs








TOTAL UNFUNDED REQUIRE^ENT $15. 5M
- 2.W
(Cruise Missile Project Report, 1986)
Figure 11. Redesigned REM Funding Requirements
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that would prevent a REM from being used until it is lost
through attrition. The per flight cost of a REM installed





$A70K / 5.55 =
$84,685
D. REM REFURBISHMENT/INSTALLATION COSTS
Costs involved in REM refurbishment/ ins tallation include
the cost of labor to put a used REM back into reuseable
condition, cost of GFP, cost to recertify various pieces of
equipment contained in the REM, and cost to install the REM
in an AUR.
Under the contract of 16 July 1986 REM installations
cost $265,347 per installation. Under the contract of 26
November 1986, material and services necessary to install
REMs into an OTL missile has escalated to a unit cost of
$306,773.
An AUR to be utilized in an OTL and recovered shall
have a REM installed prior to flight. The government
furnished REM shall consist of recovery systems, data/
telemetry systems, and range safety equipment suitable
for the test range to be utilized. Prior to
installation in the air vehicle, the REM shall undergo
testing and inspection. (JCM-1963, p. 24, 1985)
In'S accordance with the 26 November 1986 contract,
materials and services necessary to refurbish the REM, after
an OTL, has a unit cost of $48,007. This cost is not
included in the cost to purchase or install the REM. It
does, however, provide for labor costs necessary to bring
42
the REM back to reuseable condition. Unexpected damage to
the REM is not covered in this cost figure, these costs will
be addressed in the section dealing with over and above
costs. The material costs do not include recertif ication of
GFP or replacement of the REM expendable kit or a mission
pecul iar kit.
As illustrated in Figure 12, the GFP for the REM
expendable kit consists of over 50 separate parts which cost
$75,823 (this cost is in 1 98A dollars). The REM mission
peculiar kit for a SLCM depends on the missile variant used.
The mission peculiar kit for a TLAM-A (R/UGM-109A) costs
$50,247 while the mission peculiar kit for a TASM (R/UGM-
109B) costs $31,478. The government equipment provided in a
REM consists of the RCUR/Decoder (part number 76A0394-5).
The unit is recertified at the Pacific Missile Test Center
( PMTC ) , Pt. Magu, California. The cost to accomplish this
is $877 not including transportation costs, which are
considered minimal, for this study.
Contract No: N00032-84-C-4484
Control No: CM81-618-06
ITEM SUPPLIES OR SERVICES
0027 REM Expendable (REM-X)
Kit for R/UGM-109A, B,
C (USN) (EID: 76-410)
0028 REM Expendable (REM-X)
Kit for BGM-109G
(USAF) (EID:76-410)





Figure 12. Excerpt From 19 December 1984 Contract REM-X Kit
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E. AUR REFURBISHMENT AND MISSILE GFP R ECERTI FIG ATION
Refurbishment consists of those maintenance actions
required to rebuild recovered test flight AURs.
Components and body sections may be damaged during test
flight and subsequent recovery activities. Refurbish-
ment shall include disassembly; decontamination; removal
of parts and assemblies for test, repair, or replacement
of expended items, reassembly and retest. The
refurbishment AUR is delivered as a fully recertified
missile. (JCM-1963, p. ^4, 1985)
Under the contracts illustrated in Figure 13 the
average cost for basic supplies and labor services to
refurbish an AUR, after an OTL, is $247,307 for missiles
that were tested between December 1985 (T-265) and August
1986 (T-311). Under the 26 November contract, material and
services necessary to decontaminate recovered flight test
missiles and remove the SLCM REM is $33,078 per missile.
Contract No: N00032-86-C-6 1 1
3
Control No: N00032-86- PR-60730 . 03
'EM SUPPLIES OR SERVICES
0106 AUR Refurbishment
RGM-109A-1 (T-258,















TASK TOTAL FIRM FIXED PRICE
0110 1 Refurbishment of T-180 $257,902
(This represents a modification to Control No: N00032-86-
PR-60730.03)
Figure 13. Excerpts From Contract No: N00032-86-C-6 1 1 3 With
Modification of 28Feb86; AUR Refurbishment
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There is an extensive number of parts that are provided
to GD/C by the Government to properly complete the AUR
refurbishment. There are over 75 parts provided at a cost
of $335,165. Additionally, a new rocket motor must be
provided. The components for the motor cost $90,000 while
the assembly of the components adds $A0,000 to the cost.
These costs do not count any parts that are damaged beyond
the normally expected items.
Part of the costs of bringing the missile up to
requirements includes the recer t if ication of various GFPs.
These include the RMUC (sent to Litton Industries), the CMRA
(sent to Honeywell), the DSMAC (sent to the Naval Avionics
Center), and the engine (sent to WIG). The costs included
in the recertif ication process amount to $83,000.
F. AUR/REM OVER AND ABOVE REFURBISHMENT GOSTS
When a fixed firm price contract is used for repair of
equipment, that has some unknown damage possibilities, there
are usually additional repair costs. Gosts can occur while
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therefore be accomplished by the depot(s) to the extent
necessary to return of the AUR to an operationally ready
condition. (JCM-1963, p. 45, 1985)
With a REM flight, excess damage can occur from a hard
landing or from hitting large rocks or trees during landing.
Excess damage can be in the form of structural damage to the
missile or damage to missile/REM parts. Although not all
missiles or REMs incur costs that are not covered in the
basic refurbishment or recertif ication contracts (over and
above costs), most do require some additional work. The
over and above costs have had variations as great as $100K.
For example under contract N00032-86-G-3009 , T-926
experienced costs of $3,84A while T-314 experienced costs of
$108,554.
Over and above costs may not be funded in the same year
refurbishment costs are funded and funding may be applied to
different contracts. Therefore, a definitive average of
over and above costs is impractical to discern, from this
studyOs standpoint. Accordingly, the average cost generated
by CMPO of $48,000 will be used.
G. TRANSPORTATION COSTS
Shipments of classified material require that special
security precautions be taken. This includes dual driver
protective service, protective security service, exclusive
use of the vehicle, and telephone notification of shipment
location and status en route .( JCMPINST 4601. 1A, p. 1-2, 1985)
The cost of initially shipping a missile selected for an
OTL to GD/C from a weapons station or shipping a missile to
the launch center is considered only in the framework that
if the NTIK system were adopted it would be applicable. For
simplicity a missile shipment from Naval Weapons Station,
Seal Beach, Ca. and a return shipment to the Utah Test and
Training Range (UTTR) is considered. From information
provided by the CMPO the approximate cost to ship a missile
from Seal Beach is $2,100 while the cost to UTTR is
approximately $8,200.
After an OTL, only missile fragments from the destroyed
missile that are scattered about the destruction area
require shipment. However, a REM equipped OTL must be
shipped back to GD/C for refurbishment. This could be from
any test area. However, in most cases it will be from the
UTTR, San Clemente Island, Naval Weapons Center, China Lake,
Ca, or Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. Other test areas may be
off Puerto Rico or the Aleutian Islands. After
refurbishment the missile is then shipped back to its
destination, which could be Yorktown, Va., Norfolk, Va.,
Groton, Conn., Concord, Ca., Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, or Guam.
Again using UTTR the cost to ship a single missile to GD/C
is approximately $8200. As an average the cost to ship a
missile to the East Coast is used. Therefore, the cost to
ship a missile from GD/C to Norfolk, Va., as provided by the
Military Traffic Management Command, Western Area, is $3954
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per vehicle load (1.30 per vehicle mile plus .20 per mile
for dual drive service time; 2636 miles) or approximately
$2000 if two missiles (which is a more realistic number of
missiles that would be shipped together on one vehicle) are
shipped .
H. SALVAGE COSTS
Missile can be launched from land, sea, or air. In the
case of the SLCM, most launches are from sea units.
However, almost all test launches are destined to touchdown
over land. The REM is equipped with a flotation device if
the missile does go into the water, accidentally.
Unfortunately, the damage to the missile from the salt water
can be extensive.
After a Idnd touchdown, the test range ensures the
missile is safe, in relation to any unexpended portion of
payload. It then prepares the missile for shipment back to
GD/C. The costs of a REM missile recovery is as follows:
RECOVERY AREA
UTTR
Tonopah Test Range, Nevada







For purposes of this study an average cost of the four
recovery areas ($20,805) will be used.
I. RECERTIFICATION COSTS
Although recertif ication costs do not directly affect
the cost to refurbish a missile, their costs do affect the
A8
overall analysis. If a TLAM is stored for 36 months it must
be sent back to GD/C for recer tif ication . However, if that
same missile is used in an OTL its recer tif ication clock
starts all over after refurbishment and the cost to
recertify the missile does not occur. The general
assumption is that a missile will be pulled from inventory
half way through its recert if ication time clock and be used,
for testing purposes. The average cost of a recert if ication
generated by the CMPO is $202,000. This cost includes the
contractors labor to recertify the missile, GFP, and any
unscheduled maintenance. Using this figure, a cost
avoidance of $101,000 (half the recer tif ication time that
is saved times the $202,000) is realized. However, this
cost avoidance will be realized only if the REM utilized
OTLs continue and refurbishment of the missile satisfies the
recertif ication requirements.
J. PERSONNEL COSTS
A program of the magnitude of the REM project has
significant costs associated with personnel hired to work
full time on the program. There are also employees that
work part time on this program . Without extensive
research it is difficult to determine the exact number that
do work on the REM program. At the JCMPO headquarters in
Washington D.C. there are at least two individuals that work
A9
exclusively on REM analysis and policy. At DCAS GD/C there
is one individual dedicated to the program; however, there
are several others that work nonexclusively on the REM
program. They may establish proper over and above costs by
the contractor, maintain track of government missiles being
refurbished, or provide contract services. These part time
services, in themselves, more than make up the work of one
full time individual. At the test ranges there are many
individuals that work on missile recovery teams. If the
missiles were destroyed versus recovered the numbers could
easily be reduced. An FY88 proposal by the Naval Weapons
Center, China Lake (currently designated as the technical
direction agent for the REM redesign) indicates a need for
8.6 man-years to work on the REM redesign at a cost of
$1.428M. Since the redesigned REM program will take at
least two years, it is presumed, similar funds will be
required over the next two years. Some of the tasks to be
accomplished with these personnel include:
Technical design support
Support of competitive bid/proposal evaluation
Monitor development of the new REM
Monitor and evaluate design performance tests
Monitor and evaluate qualifications tests
Monitor and evaluate integration/ interface tests
Review and approval of all test plans
Review design analysis
Manage configuration and data management
Review all drawings to ensure compliance with MILSTNDs
Maintain master data package
Costs of personnel at CMPO and DCAS will be listed by
Government Service (GS) rating. Salaries for each pay level
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will be taken at step 5- Fringe benefits include 20.4% for
retirement benefits, 3.7% for insurance benefits, and 1.9%
for federal workers compensation, bonuses, etc. The
following is a breakdown of the minimum estimated cost
(Department of Defense Instruction 4100. 33H, 1980) of
personnel that work on the REM program:






















Taking the total personnel costs, of $1,593,955 ($1.428M
plus $165,955), and dividing it by an average of 18 funded
test flights per year, over the next four fiscal years,
gives an additional cost per test launch of $88,553.
K. NUCLEAR WARHEAD REMOVAL COSTS
When a TLAM-A is tested the nuclear warhead must be
removed and replaced with a unit that simulates the weight
distribution of this unit. The unit is a W80 JTA/NTA.
Removal of this unit under the contract of 26 November 1986
costs $3,776 per removal.
L. RSS UNIT AND INSTALLATION COSTS
If an OTL missile is not to be recovered the test
missile must have a government furnished RSS installed which
meets the requirements of the range over which the missile
will be flight tested. The procedure is that a selected AUR
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is shipped to the depot where a RSS package is installed.
The missile is then transferred back to the fleet for
testing. (JCM-1963, p. 24 - 44, 1985)
A test flight not configured with the REM must therefore
have a safety system installed. The RSS is the device
currently used by the CMP. Costs that are associated with
this system, that are relevant to this study, are the costs
of purchasing the RSS and the materials and services
(including labor) necessary to install the RSS into the OTL
missile .
Under the contract of 26 November 1986 item 0211, the
cost to install the RSS is $215,069. The cost to fabricate
and assemble a RSS, under a 1986 Form 1411, is an average
cost of $235,305 for the BGM-109B and the BGM-109C models.
M. COSTS OF MISSILE RECOVERY EQUIPMENT
Each fiscal year a portion of the SLCM budget is
dedicated for the expenditure of fleet support costs. These
costs include support equipment, training equipment,
documentation, and Theater Mission Planning Center (TMPC)
equipment. For FY87 the cost was approximately $61M and in
FY88 the budget calls for expenditures of over $73M. A
portion of these costs do go to the support of missile test
flights. This may include documentation or training on
missile recover'y or tools to ensure a missile is properly
prepared for shipment after recovery. Costs for the REM
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project, however, are not discernible from the remainder of
the support costs for the entire missile project and this
study does not attempt a breakdown. However, it should be
kept in mind that there is a cost to the REM project.
N. COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NTIK
When the NTIK is installed at the overseas depots:
a certified load crew will decanister the missile and
demate the W8A warhead. The NTIK will then be installed
using technical order procedures. This will include
connecting the W1 wiring harness. Test-unique functions
such as W2 harness, antenna coaxial connection, and nose
cone installation will be accomplished using additional
formal published technical data procedures. The
recanistered AUR will be uploaded and Bit accomplished.
Upon receipt of successful Bit, the AUR will be
downloaded and placed in a standard shipping container
for transport to the CONUS for flight test. Great care
will be taken to ensure accountability of AUR components
during packing. The AUR will be flown to the designated
launch site support airfield, then transported to the
launch site. (Concept of GLCM Flight Evaluation
Operations and Logistics, p. 2, 1986)
Figures 1A and 15 depict the NTIK system design.
The unit cost of the GLCM NTIK is $350K per unit. The
pre-flight costs per unit (includes reassembly of the
missile, pre-flight testing and calibration, and packaging
for shipment) costs $3.2K. (Hill and Myers, p.A-6, 1986)
When utilizing the NTIK in an OTL the test flight can be
conducted for the maximum time that a non-test missile could
be flown. This is possible because the NTIK does not
displace any of the fuel section of the missile, as is the
case with the REM. The NTIK OTL can last an one and one-































































This increases the costs at the test ranges and aircraft
tracking time. The test ranges support costs total an
additional $12. 5K per hour or $18.75K per OTL. The
additional flight costs of an F-4 to track the missile
during flight time is $^K per hour or $6K per OTL. (Hill and
Myers
,
p. 1 0, 1 986 )
Due to the different structure of the SLCM from the GLCM
a variation of the NTIK, would have to be developed for each
SLCM. The TLAM-A uses a W80 warhead versus the W84 warhead
used in the GLCM. The nose cone areas of the TASM and TLAM-
C are also different and would require an NTIK of a
different variation. No exact costs can be determined for
these alternatives without soliciting the contractors for
bids. Development costs would be a big factor even if the
costs of a SLCM NTIK were similar to the GLCM NTIK.
0. COST ANALYSIS
As indicated, the costs of utilizing a REM vary from
those paid to the contractor through firm fixed price
contracts to the everyday operating costs of the project
office. The major costs, such as the GFP for the missile
and the REM installation, are the costs that can be directly
associated with the missile refurbishment. Cost factors for
personnel or the recertif ication cost avoidance are more
intangible, but they should be included as costs to the
program. After all, if the REM program did not exist the
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number of personnel cited herein could have been utilized
elsewhere, or employment vacancies may not have even been
generated .












REM GFP Recertif ication
AUR Refurbishment
AUR GFP Required
AUR Rocket Motor and assembly
AUR Parts Recer t if ica t ion
REM Removal and Decontamination
Over and Above Costs
Extra Transporation Costs
Salvage Costs
Personnel Costs (per flight; 18 per year)
Recertif ication Cost Avoidance
Nuclear Warhead Removal
When using average figures, such as number of tests
flights per year or the number of times a REM can be
utilized in a average life cycle, disparities in the figures
can easily materialize. Within this study the cost swings
should occur in the lower cost items (those under $100K).
Thus, the effects of any changes in operational factors on
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IV. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. ALTERNATIVES REVIEW
The analysis contained herein looks at alternative
solutions to the procedures under which the REM program
could be run. The alternatives described may be either
conventional or unconventional in terms of present program
philosophy. However, it is always healthy to look at a
program that has been in existence as long as the REM
program from perspectives not previously considered. This
research study has not analyzed the cost of the program in
its entirety, nor does it make judgements on the way
operational tests should be conducted. Instead, it analyzes
the cost of testing an individual missile. All costs relate
to the cost information provided in Chapter III. The
following alternatives will be discussed in this research
s tudy :
Maintain use of the current REM model
Buy a new redesigned REM model
Don't use REMs and destroy all test missiles
Use up in stock REMs, then destroy all test missiles
Convert to use of the NTIK
Compete the produc tion/ refurbishment of the REM
B. MAINTAIN USE OF THE CURRENT REM MODEL
Using the current REM model would mean scrapping plans
for the development of a new redesigned REM model. One of
the reasons given for scrapping the current REM model and
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converting production to a new REM model was to increase
reliability of the unit. However, since 1980 the REM has
not been the cause of a single failure of an OTL. Figure 1
,
in Chapter II describes both of these failures. Using the
current REM does mean a missile would have to be demated if
problems are discovered after installation. This is in
contrast to the convenience of pulling out an electronics
shelf as would be possible on the redesigned REM. Benefits
of having a new redesigned REM as described by GD/C are
illustrated in Figure 16. Continuous use of the current REM
would require purchase of additional REMs for use in future
years, as illustrated in Figure 17. Therefore, REMs in
inventory can not be considered as sunk cost when using this
option. There are currently 29 REMs in inventory, with 5
more REMs scheduled for delivery in FY88. Using an 18%
attrition rate the current supply will be exhausted in just
over 6 years. REM turn aroundtime, from removal after an
OTL to ready for use condition, would further shorten the
availability of the REM, without replacements.
The cost of an OTL using the current REM model is
depicted in Figure 18. At a cost of $1.46M it may not seem
cost beneficial to refurbish the test missile in the case of
a TLAM-A or a TASM, which cost $1.A3M and $1.58M,
respectively. This is especially true if one considers that
at a projected inflation rate of 3.5% over the next three


























































































































































COSTS TO REFURBISH A CRUISE MISSILE
USING THE CURRENT REM MODEL
ITEM COST




REM GFP Recertif ication
AUR Refurbishment
AUR GFP Required
AUR Rocket Motor and assembly
AUR Parts Recert if ication
REM Removal and Decontamination
Over and Above Costs
Extra Transporation Costs
Salvage Costs
Personnel Costs (per flight)
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$1 ,461 363
Figure 18. Current REM Costs
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$1.66M. However, it must be remembered that if a REM isn't
utilized a safety system must be installed. Therefore, the
cost to install an RSS must be considered. The relevant








The net cost to utilize a REM in an operational test is
$1,010,989 ($1,461,363 minus $450,374) when the RSS
requirements are considered. This makes the use of the
current REM a viable alternative in all SLCM variants able
to effectively accomodate the REM.
C. BUY THE NEW REDESIGNED REM
To buy the new REM will mean funding the necessary
transition to production (TTP) costs. It will,
alternatively, decrease the costs of REM utilized OTL as the
unit cost of the new REM is less then the cost of building
the current REM model. This factor will be more significant
five to ten years into the program as the TTP costs are no
longer a factor. The costs will be similar to the cost of
using the current REM with the following exceptions:
ITEM (Per Flight) COST
Redesigned REM Cost $ 84,685
REM TTP Costs 155,556
Additional Personnel Costs 79,333
Costs for NWC, China Lake ($1.428M)
Current REM Cost (134, 775 )
Total Additional Cost; New REM $184,799
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Using a present value (PV) analysis of the project, with
a cost of capital of 10% over the next 15 years the
following costs are provided (REM unit savings is equal to
the cost per flight of the current REM, of $134,775, minus
the cost per flight of the redesigned REM, of $84,685, times
18 test flights per year):
ITEM COST/
SAVINGS
TTP Costs $1 4, 000, 000
Personnel Costs 1,428,000
REM Unit Savings 901,620
















Considering the high cost for TTP and the additional
personnel costs the purchase of a new redesigned REM can not
be justified from strictly a cost standpoint.
D. USE THE RSS ON ALL FUTURE TEST FLIGHTS
As previously specified, if a missile does not utilize
the REM a safety system must be installed. The RSS is the
safety system in current use. Therefore, no matter whether
the REM or RSS is utilized there is a cost. For the REM it
is the $1.46M to refurbish the missile, and for the RSS it
is $450K for unit and installation costs plus the cost of a
new missile (costs vary from $1.4M for a TLAM-A to $1.8M for
a TLAM-C). Unless the cost of utilizing a REM increase 33%
faster than the cost of an RSS and a new missile the REM
should be used on future OTLs.
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E. USE REMs IN STOCK THEN USE THE RSS
With 34 REMs in stock, after delivery of 5 new REMs in
FY88 and an 18% attrition rate the REMs in stock should last
approximately 6 years. Since the REMs in stock are sunk
costs the real cost to redo a REM missile is as follows:
ITEM COST
Current REM Refurbishment Cost $1,497,270
Current REM Unit Costs (per flight) 1 34
, 775
Updated REM Refurbishment Cost $1,362,495
However, this temporary cost savings of $134,775 over 18
test flights for 6 years cannot offset the costs of
purchasing new missiles, at an average cost of $1 .8M, in the
later years of the program. Therefore, this is not a viable
option .
F. CONVERT TO USE OF THE NTIK
The NTIK is an alternate system to the RSS. To utilize
this system the Navy would be required to spend millions of
dollars in development and TTP costs. The savings in
utilizing the NTIK over the RSS would be only in the
reduction of installation costs. There are SLCM variants
that are tested with an RSS, therefore, a cost analysis of
the use of the NTIK and the RSS can be made. Cost
projections through the defense contractors will have to be
made in order to present an accurate analysis of the
situation. But, in the overall analysis it does not appear
beneficial to use the NTIK in place of the REM for the same
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reasons it is not beneficial to use the RSS in place of the
REM.
G. COMPETE THE PRODUCTION OF THE REM
As illustrated in this research study, determining the
true costs of utilizing the REM has been difficult. Current
contracting procedures have corrected some of the problems
(i.e. REM costs are broken down into separate items in the
contract versus being grouped into the overall missile
costs). However, tracking the spiraling costs of the REM
program is impractical, due in part to the above
circumstances, although the costs have appeared to be
increasing at a pace well above the current rate of
inflation. For example, the average cost of a REM and
Mission Peculiar Kit in Contract number N00032-83-C-3329 of
23 May 1983 was $416,620. In 1987 the average cost was
$748K. This represents an average cost increase of almost
16% per year over the last four years. The cost to
refurbish a REM in the contract of 23 May 1983 was $32,153
versus a cost of $48,007 in 1987. This represents an
increase of over 10% per year.
At these rates it may be cost effective to use the RSS
in test flights in a matter of years. These increases can
be attributed, at least in part, to the use of a single
source contractor. If these costs were in line with the
real inflation rates, during the past four years the cost
66
increases should have been approximately 6% per year.
Additional considerations of learning curve factors and
economies of scale should have also meant a decrease in
costs.
Competition for this multi-million dollar program will
in all likelihood reverse the cost trends of the past. It
may, in fact, make production of a new redesigned REM cost
effective. However, this alternative requires more detailed
analysis .
H. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Current negotiations with the Soviet Union call for vast
decreases in nuclear weapons in Europe. If negotiations are
fruitful, the United States may have an excess of GLCMs.
Due to the modular design of the Cruise Missile GLCMs can be
converted to SLCMs. However, this may produce an inventory
of SLCMs that is far in excess of those needed to
practically defend this country. With this in mind, it
would then be beneficial to utilize a RSS or NTIK in OTLs of
the Cruise Missile. The relevant costs in this situation
would be the $450K to use a RSS versus a cost of $1.46M to
utilize a REM.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
In a project the size of the REM program change occurs
gradually over the course of time. In the case of the REM
the program has continually expanded from its conception in
the late 1970's. During the present time decisions are
being made as to the cost effectiveness of building a new
REM. From the data presented in this research study, at the
present time it is cost effective to utilize the REM for
OTLs. The question becomes, what direction should the REM
program take over the next several years?
The most effective direction appears to be utilization
of the current REM and scrapping the plans to build a new
redesigned REM. This is mainly due to the high costs of TTP
and extra personnel costs. However, part of the problem may
center around the single source strategy used by the CMPO.
If the redesigned REM along with refurbishment was competed
between defense contractors, such as GD/C and MDAC, the cost
might certainly decrease over the long run. At least the
high inflationary trends that currently exist in the program
may cease.
Considering cost factors while excluding technical
factors, the TTP costs will have to decrease by over $8M for
the redesigned REM to be cost effective. A decrease in the
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cost of the redesigned REM will also offset the costs for
TTP. It should be remembered that 18 REM flights were used
as a utilization factor. If fewer flight are planned or a
shorter payback period on the program is sought the cost per
flight will increase, since $1AM is a high fixed cost. The
TTP costs may also be too high a cost to spend in relation
to current budget constraints.
The use of the NTIK should be evaluated against the use
of the RSS. To do this a preliminary evaluation can be made
with GD/C (current contractor for the GLCM NTIK) as to
feasibility and cost effectiveness.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The overall recommendation is to continue to use the
current REM. This includes purchase of the current REM
model to meet outyear requirements. However, competition
should be investigated for this program. Unfortunately, the
size of the program may not allow the same type of dual
sourcing that missile procurement experiences.
If substantial reductions can be made in the cost of the
new redesigned REM the transition should then be made.
Finally, to maintain cost effectiveness of the program, one
division of the program office should be given the





ABL Armored Box Launcher
ALCM Air Launched Cruise Missile
AUR All-Up Round
BAC Boeing Aircraft Company
CMPO Cruise Missiles Project Office
DOD Department of Defense
DSARC Defense System Acquisition Review Council
DSMAC Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator
GD/C General Dynamics Convair Division
GFE Government Furnished Equipment
GFP Government Furnished Property
GLCM Ground Launched Cruise Missile
JCMPO Joint Cruise Missiles Project Office
K Thousand
M Mill ion
MDAC McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
NM Nautical Miles
NTIK Non-Tactical Instrumentation Kit
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTL Operational Test Launch
PCM Pulse Code Modulation
REM Recovery Exercise Module
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SAC Strategic Air Command
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SCAD Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SLBM Sea Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM Sea Launched Cruise Missile
TAAM Tomahawk Airfield Attack Missile
TASM Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile
TLAM-A Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (Nuclear)
TLAM-C Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (Conventional)
TLAM-D Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (Multiple Payloads)
TEL Transporter Erector Launcher
TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan
TERCOM Terrain Contour Matching
TTP Transition to Production
UFC Unit Flyaway Cost
VLS Vertical Launch System
WIC Williams International Corporation
WPAFB Wright Patterson Air Force Base
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